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Media 
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Michelangelo Conoscenti, University of Turin 
 
ABSTRACT. Since 2001, media have frequently touched upon the issue of the crisis of the 
international liberal order. The message sent to the Western audience was, however, reassuring. 
The search for renovation of international rules and institutions created after World War II was 
expected to take place within the framework of the American-led order. Trump’s appearance on 
the stage of the presidential campaign, in the spring of 2016, was, in this respect, a tipping point. 
The idea that the media started conveying was that an actual transition in the international 
domain had been triggered and the outcome might be unfortunate. The aim of this essay is to 
show how the discourse in the press and expert media has developed since then, leading a wider 
readership to perceive that the liberal order may in fact come to an end soon. A return to a 
competition among the great powers, and possibly conflict, was at first presented as the most 
probable scenario. A strategy of discursive accommodation seems to have later been enacted by 
the press and expert knowledge media so that public opinion could adjust to China’s new role as 
the newly-emerging responsible power upholding order. These findings were reached by adopting 
a discourse analysis methodology which integrates and complements the perspectives of 
International Relations and Linguistics.   





The coverage of international news by the press is usually prompted by events whose 
intrinsic relevance is expected to arouse substantial interest in the readers even if they take place 
in faraway places. While describing such events, journalists and columnists, in particular, often 
refer to concepts borrowed from the scholars’ and practitioners’ toolkit to better convey their 
significance, or even emphasize it, so as to attract broader attention. Seldom are such concepts 
used but as catchwords, though. In the past few years, proactive foreign policy decisions taken by 
emerging actors, such as China and Russia, have been associated with incipient multipolarity. The 
newspapers, however, did not devote much space to make readers aware of what this change may 
entail, if not for that of conveying a general sense of disquiet.   
                                                            
1 Sections 1. Introduction, 2. Methodology and 7. Conclusion are co-authored. Sections 3. and 4. are by Anna 
Caffarena. Sections 5. and 6. are by Michelangelo Conoscenti. The research questions, the collection of the corpus and 
the overall development of the research are by Anna Caffarena. Michelangelo Conoscenti’s analyses were carried out 
to benchmark the findings of sections 3 and 4 . He also made the corpus machine-readable. 
 
Only in very special circumstances do highly consequential events in world politics trigger 
the sort of press coverage which requires the writer to draw on the full inventory of International 
Relations (IR) concepts to tackle them competently. The fall of the Berlin wall was one of those. 
The media, while describing the end of bipolarism, nurtured the expectation that the liberal order 
– rule-based, open, market-oriented – once globalized, would foster democratization and 
economic growth worldwide. The disappointment that accompanied globalization’s delivery in the 
Western world proves that this complex message had effectively been passed on.   
The argument we will advance in this essay is that the appearance of Donald Trump on the 
stage of the American presidential campaign was an event bringing highly important 
consequences of the kind we have just mentioned. Even before he gave his only foreign policy 
speech, not yet as the Republican candidate (27 April 2016), the media started considering that 
the international (liberal) order, American leadership and the West as a key player in world affairs, 
may not survive his election. To strengthen the message, this discourse, which at the time was 
clearly meant to influence American voters, also hinted at emerging countries as candidates eager 
to fill the vacuum possibly created by an isolationist America under a Trump presidency.  
Since 20012, when the BRICs – Brazil, Russia, India and China – were portrayed as a new 
force in global governance, media repeatedly touched upon the issue of the crisis of liberal order 
and the need to renovate the international institutions established after World War II. The effects 
of the Great Recession later reinforced this conclusion, but the reassuring message sent to the 
Western audience was still very much one of changes occurring within the American-led order. 
Trump’s appearance was, in this respect, a tipping point. The idea that the media started 
conveying was that a transition had been triggered and the outcome might be unfortunate. 
The aim of this essay is to show how the discourse in the press and expert media has 
developed since the spring of 2016, leading a wider readership to perceive that the liberal order 
may in fact come to an end soon. Such a ‘regime change’3 is said to be prompted by Trump’s 
‘America first’ agenda that will prevent the US from upholding it. A return to a competition among 
the great powers is at first presented as the most probable consequence of order demise. After Xi 
Jinping’s World Economic Forum speech in Davos, given a few days before Inauguration (20 
January 2017), the unexpectedly well-received self-candidacy of China to become the defender of 
globalization and free trade may be considered interesting evidence that, after sending a message 
of pure discomfort, the media appear to be ‘preparing’ the readership for the announced 
transition.  
In a situation of perceived lack of leadership, China is no longer presented as a threat but 
rather as an, albeit puzzling, resource for the international community since the preservation of 
order – any order – is set by the press as a priority. Accommodation is the term that IR scholars 
would use to convey this strategy were it implemented by decision makers of established powers 
in world affairs. What we observe is, in fact, a variant of this strategy, discursively performed by 
commentators to the benefit of their readership. Since “it is the stories that states and societies 
                                                            
2 Famously by Jim O’Neill of Goldman Sachs, whose very successful acronym points to emerging countries as the new 
‘bricks’ of a new architecture of global governance.  
3 To political scientists, regime change is what transition entails in the domestic domain. “If Mr Trump were to win, it 
would be a regime change for the world”, M. Wolf, “How the West might soon be lost”, Financial Times, 27 September 
2016. 
 
tell themselves and others that lead to conflict, or which allow a different, more peaceful path to 
be pursued” (Coker, 2015: 90), this framing of China’s new constructive international role may 
turn out to be crucial in the years to come. 
The essay develops as follows. After some methodological clarifications, it examines how 
Trump and his worldview are initially reported, suggesting that, at this early stage, the focus on his 
personality and deep-seated beliefs makes up for the lack of a fully-fledged foreign policy4. The 
discourse on how his tenure will affect the state of the liberal order is then analysed, to show how 
it foreshadows an outright return to power politics and conflict. The emerging role of China is then 
traced across the whole corpus. The discourse articulated since Trump’s appearance reveals that 
an absolute value is attached to order itself by Western media leading to a new recognition of 




 The analysis of media discourse will be conducted from the complementary IR and 
linguistics perspectives. In fact, both consider discourses as ‘resources’ used by producers of texts 
to give meaning to the world, thus influencing receivers’ worldview. In particular, the discourses 
developed in the media as ‘sites of institutionalised power’ appear ‘inherently political’ as they are 
clearly “about the production and distribution of power, and struggles over knowledge, interests, 
identity and the social relations they enable or undermine” (Laffey and Weldes, 2004: 28; Milliken, 
1999).  
Some recurring themes within the press coverage of Trump’s impact on order will thus be 
enucleated from the perspective of the IR scholar (sections 3 and 4) which will later be tested by 
the linguist (sections 5 and 6). The specific contribution that the linguist offers to IR and political 
communication scholars moves from the assumption that  
language is an irreducible part of social life, dialectically interconnected with other elements of social 
life, so that social analysis and research always has to take account of language. One productive way of 
doing social research is through a focus on language, using some form of discourse analysis. (Fairclough, 
2004: 2) 
 
As a consequence, linguistic discourse analysis encourages critical language awareness and 
highlights the use of a persuasive function in texts that is evident in the mechanisms of word 
selection and other recurrent patterns such as syntactic forms. The co-occurrence of these will 
influence and determine the interpretations made available to text receivers. 
Critical Discourse and Metaphor Analysis, complemented by data mined with corpus 
linguistics techniques, will document how the communicative strategies and the discourse on 
Trump are enacted. In particular, it will be shown that a peculiar preoccupation is evident in all the 
articles considered: the authorship is aligned with an agenda that shows an evaluative intent. The 
linguistic analysis, through successive steps, i.e. frequency lists, distribution lists, Z-score 
correlations, pattern and cluster analysis will show how the hypotheses discussed in sections 3 and 
4 are attested by the language observed, indicating that conceptual metaphors are used to 
communicate a new ‘accommodating’ interpretative frame.  
                                                            
4 D.E. Sanger, G. Harris, M. Landler, in “Where Trump Zings, Tillerson Zags, Putting Him at Odds With the White 
House”, The New York Times, 25 June 2017, maintain that the Trump administration is still in search of consistency.  
 
The analysis is carried out on a corpus of 82 articles from 23rd March 2016 to 23rd June 
2017.  Articles have been taken from The Financial Times and Foreign Affairs (the two-monthly 
journal of the US Council of Foreign Relations). Furthermore, two on-line resources, namely the 
Brookings’ Order from Chaos Blog and The Project Syndicate, have been included as expert media 
sources. The latter are meant to sustain educated reflection on the part of a specialized audience 
– experts, practitioners and interested individuals – and to provide support to decision-makers. 
For linguists, this is a so-called specialized or ‘small’ corpus5, i.e. one with a limited time-span and 
with a specific area of investigation, in this case the anticipated impact of Trump’s election on 
world order. Other media have been monitored to capture the climate of opinion on the topic. 
  
  
3. The Tipping Point: Trump Enters the Scene 
In the last few years, the media have regularly reported that US leadership has been 
imperilled and that international institutions have failed over and again to meet expectations in 
terms of delivery. However, it was only after Trump’s victorious presidential campaign took off 
that they depicted the liberal order as faced with a truly existential threat.  In this respect, it is a 
telling point that over the past troubled decade no main cover line of the influential International 
Affairs journal has called into question the future of the international order or system as such. To 
be sure, though, readers were made aware that a reform was urgently needed to enhance both its 
effectiveness and legitimacy.  
Donald Trump’s appearance on the world stage was a tipping point in this respect. The required 
overhaul of the international order did not appear to have any chance to be undertaken by a 
Trump presidency and the consequences for the durability of order itself were said to be dramatic. 
Even before addressing his worldview and foreign policy, his personality was depicted by the 
Financial Times columnists as unfit to lead the country that was expected to supervise its 
renovation. Trump was presented as utterly inconsistent, even before he openly praised 
unpredictability in his 27 April speech,6 and thus intrinsically unable to express the kind of grand 
design necessary to provide guidance to the international community. His inclination towards 
deal-making over strategic thinking was defined as the typical mind-set of a businessman, who 
should consequently not be considered a politician by readers, let alone a political leader. “In his 
writings on business – Rachman wrote –, he has extolled the virtues of making extravagant 
demands or promises as an opening bid, before eventually finding a compromise. This approach 
might work well in real estate. But it is potentially a formula for disaster in international politics”7. 
Moreover, his populist attitude and his sympathy for authoritarian rulers, such as Vladimir Putin, 
made him an unlikely champion of liberal values, the distinguishing feature of Western order after 
WW II8. The message conveyed to the readers by the press is perfectly summarized by the title of 
a recent New York Times article: “Donald Trump Poisons the World”. Here Brooks argues that “by 
treating the world simply as an arena for competitive advantage, Trump, McMaster and Cohn, 
sever relationships, destroy reciprocity, erode trust and eviscerate the sense of sympathy, 
friendship and loyalty that all nations need when times get tough”, in a word they raze the very 
                                                            
5 It consists of 122,081 tokens (running words) and 9,898 types (distinct words, i.e. its vocabulary). All the corpus 
linguistics statistics and tables are originals and generated by  M. Conoscenti with the WordSmith Tools 7 package. 
6  https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/28/us/politics/transcript-trump-foreign-policy.html 
7 G. Rachman, “Donald Trump’s retreat from American greatness”, Financial Times, 23 May 2016. 
8 G. Rachman, “Donald Trump faces five fateful foreign policy choices”, Financial Times, 12 December 2016.    
 
foundations of order9. His legitimacy to act internationally is thus questioned, despite the position 
the US still enjoys within the system. 
Trump’s problematic character appears in the press to be compounded by his foreign 
policy inclination. Defined as ‘hyperrealist’ for the transactional, zero-sum view he holds of 
relations between the great powers10, his approach to world politics is said to reflect the defence 
of a narrowly defined national interest. Given his ‘America First’ agenda, Trump is depicted as 
expressing with paroxysmal intensity a ‘bellicose’ or ‘muscular’ form of isolationism11, well beyond 
the pro-retrenchment12 attitude shared by part of the American electorate.13 Since he appeared, 
and still appears, more unilateralist than isolationist, the fact that he is consistently presented as 
an isolationist suggests that commentators wish to take this interpretation to its extremes in order 
to signal a sharp change with respect to post World War II pro-engagement international 
liberalism.   
One far-reaching effect of Trump’s outright embracing of the most primitive ‘realist’ 
worldview 14 is that ‘the raw politics of power’15 came to be presented to the public opinion more 
and more as an accurate description of present international relations. The media retrieved a 
number of concepts belonging to this tradition to describe Trump’s world, namely the place in 
which America’s friends and foes must take their own foreign policy decisions. In a neo-Hobbesian 
environment, the absence of conflict was said to depend on the balance of power, while the great 
powers were portrayed as intent on building their respective spheres of interest. As mentioned 
earlier, the chief preoccupation passed on to the public opinion was that emerging countries 
might fill the power and leadership void that America’s isolationism was creating. Such framing of 
world politics – besides taking the readers back to the Eighteenth century16 – was obviously 
antipodal with respect to depicting it as orderly (albeit to a variable extent). So much so that, 
initially, the sort of transition commentators envisaged was of the ‘back to the future’ kind: the 
international system was said to be doomed to sheer disorder. This was a clearly distressing 
scenario for states and individuals alike. Should it materialise, even normal day-to-day activities, 
such as commercial and scientific exchanges, would be very difficult,  if not completely impeded.   
Commentators clearly intend to create a sharp contrast between order and the lack of 
order. While Trump is presented as not credible, unpredictable, fostering uncertainty, in particular 
among allies, and thus leading to a probable case of dangerous miscalculations on the part of the 
other countries’ decision makers, the American-led liberal order is depicted using words such as 
‘design’, ‘architecture’, ‘institutions as pillars’, which emphasize its stability and durability. Order is 
                                                            
9 D. Brooks (2 June 2017: A25).  H. R. McMaster is National security advisor to Mr Trump while G. Cohn chairs the 
National Economic Council, being his chief economic advisor. 
10 P. Stephens, “The Trumpian Threat to the global order”, Financial Times, 22 September 2016. 
11 See P. Stephens, “Donald Trump would tear up the Pax Americana”, Financial Times, 5 May 2016 and P. Stephens, 
“Global Disorder: from Donald Trump to the South China Sea”, Financial Times, 21 July 2016.   
12 An attitude well supported by scholarly opinion, see Posen, 2014. 
13 A Pew Research Center poll released on 5 May 2016 shows that 57% of Americans believe the US should deal with 
its own problems and let others deal with theirs as best they can, http://www.people-press.org/2016/05/05/public-
uncertain-divided-over-americas-place-in-the-world/ 
14 “Trump seems set to do on a global scale what former President George W. Bush did to the Middle East – 
intentionally destabilize the old order, and then fail to create a new one” since even his instinctive adherence to 
Realism key tenets is questioned, S. Ben-Ami, “Trump’s Unrealpolitik”, Project Syndicate, 4 January 2017.   
15 P. Stephens, “The Trumpian Threat to the global order”, cit. 
16 T. Wright, “Trump’s 19th century foreign policy”, Politico, 1 January 2016. 
 
said to be ’anchored’ by a set of values. The contrast is strong, passing on to the readers the 
message that if the building collapses, there will be no ways to restore it. This framing in terms of 
radical discontinuity suggests that the international community is presently facing a real turning 
point. The fall of the US-led order, by the way, will not affect only America’s global role, but the 
West ‘as central force in global affairs’,17 a wording which clearly hints to (once) shared values. 
 
4. Trump, the Future of World (Dis)Order and China 
Given the value Trump attaches to unpredictability, the discourse on the impact of his 
presidency on world politics is evolving as his foreign policy unfolds and we can expect it will do 
until the end of his tenure. Different scenarios have thus been drawn since he gained the 
nomination as the Republican candidate. “This is not quite a Hobbesian world – Philip Stephens 
wrote in July 2016 – but the direction of travel is evident”18. The same columnist, in January 2017, 
further strengthened his argument by observing: “The long-term threat is that Mr Trump’s 
presidency sees a Pax Americana that has sustained relative peace and stability for the past 70 
years dissolve into a return to the Hobbesian world of great power conflict”.19 The article was a Big 
Read,  i.e. a full page article, meant to attract the attention of the readers and the tone – a week 
to the inauguration – sounded more worried than ever.  
By that time, Trump was no longer presented as an instance of a troubled world, but rather 
as a force behind unwelcome developments in international affairs. War was explicitly mentioned 
as a possible outcome of his conduct. On 6 February, Brookings circulated a report by Robert 
Kagan, entitled “Backing Into World War III”. The scaring argument Kagan, undoubtedly a Realist, 
advances is that “history shows that world orders do collapse” and that “when they do it is often 
unexpected, rapid, and violent”. Readers made anxious by this argument, were then informed that 
it is ‘unmistakable’ that we are on a path to a global crisis and that “the new administration is 
more likely to hasten us toward a crisis than slow or reverse these trends”. To enhance the 
frightening message sent to readers worldwide, the May/June 2017 issue of Foreign Affairs 
includes an article by Gordon entitled “A vision of Trump at War. How the President could stumble 
into war”.  
In the press, the post-liberal order scenarios are predictably just sketched. The aim is to 
convey a general idea of what each may entail for people’s everyday life: live in peace or struggle 
in conflict, in the end. After pointing to sheer disorder and conflict, commentators20 suggest that 
emerging powers, while filling the void left by Trump’s America, may wish to negotiate a ‘new 
concert’ as the one that kept the peace for a while after 1815 (soon replaced for functional 
reasons by institutionalized multilateralism, it should be pointed out). A second scenario is ‘half-
organized disorder’, a possible product of weakening current order when a proper alternative, 
supported by a willing new leader, is lacking. Finally, there is a third one, put forward by “another 
school of thought – call it realism, pragmatism or, more realistically, fatalism – that says there is 
                                                            
17 M. Wolf, “How The West May Soon Be Lost”, cit. 
18 P.Stephens, “Global disorder: from Donald Trump to the South China Sea”, cit.   
19 P. Stephens, “Trump presidency: America First or America Alone?”, Financial Times, 9 January 2017. 
20 In particular P. Stephens, “How the west has lost the world”, Financial Times, 13 October 2016. 
 
simply nothing to be done. Later, if not sooner, this multipolar world will find a new equilibrium”. 
Alarmingly, nothing is said about what might happen in the meantime. 
 In January, just before Trumps steps in as President, the alternative scenarios – drawn by 
Martin Wolf in his “The long and painful journey to world disorder”21 – boil down to two, where 
the second clearly paves the way for a reconsideration of the role of emerging countries. “The 
question – he writes – is whether what follows will be an unravelling of the post-WW II era into 
deglobalization and conflict, as happened in the first half of the 20th century, or a new period in 
which non-western powers, especially China and India, play a bigger role in sustaining a co-
operative global order”.  
How this option – presented earlier as disruptive, even threatening – is finally made 
palatable to Western readers comes out by looking at expert media. Foreign Affairs has devoted 
its first four 2017 issues of the journal to order transition. The wording of all the main cover lines is 
more than suggestive: “Out of order? The Future of the International System” stands out on the 
January/February issue cover. After “Trump Time”, we get “Present at the Destruction”, and finally 
a puzzling “What now?”. It is worth mentioning that various contributions are collected in an 
Anthology of the Foreign Affairs Series shrewdly entitled “What Was the Liberal Order? The World 
We May Be Losing”. 
The authors of the articles seem to elaborate the ’change’ scenario as if the old order were 
already gone. Niblett, for example, in his “Liberalism in Retreat. The Demise of a Dream”22, writes 
that established supporters of liberal order are weaker than ever and autocratic governments 
might hence try to take advantage of the situation. Since resorting to containment may bring 
about conflict, he suggests “for liberal countries to prepare themselves for a period of awkward 
coexistence with illiberal ones, cooperating on some occasions and competing on others”. The sort 
of accommodation to the new realities suggested by Mazarr, in his “The Once and Future 
Order”23, is no different. His suggestion is that America should go for a ’mixed order‘ – neither 
unified, nor homogeneous – made of “several different yet overlapping forms of order: universal 
and major-power-centric24, global and regional, political and economic, liberal and realist”. In a 
sense, Mazarr draws a scenario for the future that appears to be designed to increase flexibility in 
responding to other major powers claims to a greater role in world affairs. After all “burgeoning 
multipolarity does not have to be at odds with an inclusive and mutually beneficial global system”, 
writes Solana, former NATO Secretary-General. In the global order “revisited”, he goes on, “rising 
powers like China are equipped to act as responsible stakeholders” (Project Syndicate, 23 June 
2017).  
The trend in the press and expert media is clear in this respect. While, in the first articles, 
no distinction was made between Russia and China since they were both presented to the readers 
as challengers of the international liberal order, the attitude towards Beijing changes well before 
Xi Jinping’s Davos speech. After a few articles stressing the demise of the West as a force behind 
                                                            
21 Financial Times, 5 January 2017, the format is a full page Big Read. 
22 In Foreign Affairs, 96, 1, p. 24. 
23 In Foreign Affairs, 96, 1, p. 30.   
24 China fosters the adoption of the major powers label in place of great powers to avoid replicating the game of the 
great power politics. In terms of discursive power China has scored far better than the West recently, see Breslin 
2016; Zhao 2016. 
 
world order and the ensuing risks, on 5 November the Financial Times hosts a piece by Stephens 
entitled “China must learn to be a great power”. Here the idea that “a new order must 
accommodate both” America and China is openly set forth.  
The discourse is then developed by the newspaper through an article commenting on Xi 
Jinping’s speech at Davos by Acharya, tellingly entitled “Emerging powers can be saviours of the 
global liberal order” (18 January 2017). The accompanying photo, however, does not show the 
BRIC summit participants, but President Xi Jinping alone. The argument set forth is that “While 
China’s approach to globalism rejects liberal political values, it may nevertheless help to ease 
international uncertainty as the Trump administration takes over in Washington”. That China’s 
understanding of globalization and global order should be better considered by supporters of 
liberal principles is certainly stressed by other contributors25, but the point is that there is 
apparently no alternative to China taking the lead and provide the needed public goods at the 
international level. Corpus linguistics analysis will show how Beijing is made to appear reliable, 
while framing its new role, essentially by downplaying its potential disruptiveness.  
On the other hand, Trump’s position is so outspoken with respect to his unwillingness to 
provide international public goods, such as security, that America is presented as a ‘mercenary 
superpower’, whose protection can be enjoyed only by those who pay26. It goes without saying 
that this metaphor projects the idea of America as utterly untrustworthy and, as such, unfit to 
lead. The absence of Europe, which seems to be able to play no role unless it cooperates within 
the West, is striking.27 However paradoxical, this is the worldview the wider western audience has 
received from some of the most influential international media since Trump appeared on the 
world stage, in the spring of 2016. 
 
5. Communicating the Tipping Point: Metaphors of Order 
The goal of sections 5 and 6 is documenting how the communicative strategies and the 
discourse on Trump are enacted, while confirming the evaluative intent of the articles present in 
the corpus. Beside the tenet discussed in the methodological section, this part builds on Stubbs’ 
(2001: 149-215) idea that:  
The world could be represented in all kinds of ways, but certain ways of talking about events and people 
become frequent… Some ideas are formulated over and over again, such that, although they are 
conventional, they come to seem natural. The frequency makes conventional look ‘natural’…Repeated 
patterns show that evaluative meanings are not merely personal and idiosyncratic, but widely shared in 
a discourse community.  
 
In this particular case, corpus linguistics and its tools, namely specific software for datamining 
texts, allows the researcher to detect those regularities in news that reverberate  the academic 
and political discourse, thus defining the ‘public idiom’ and the consequent ‘formation of 
consensus’ (Fowler, 1991) on the topic.  
                                                            
25 See for example  J. Kynge, “China stakes a claim for globalism without liberalism”, Financial Times, 27 January 2017. 
26 Niblett, “Liberalism in Retreat”, cit., p. 20.   
27 Only one article underlines an opportunity for Europe arising from Trump’s isolationism, see A. Stubb, “It’s Europe’s 
turn to fill the global power vacuum”, Financial Times, 3 February 2017.  
 
The initial issue addressed in the first part of the analysis is the adoption of the IR terminology, 
concepts and thematic contexts28 by journalists in the attempt to define the new evidence they 
are observing, i.e. the tipping point generated by the rise of ‘Trump the candidate’. Since, as we 
will see later, “No matter what an or the international world, or global society is, scholars think 
about it and communicate about it metaphorically” (Marks, 2011: 55), the first test has been 
carried out on the way specific terms, linked to the domain of IR, are distributed throughout the 
corpus. These document the way scholars express their theories and, in this case, journalists 
memetically replicate their concepts showing acceptance of the theoretical assumptions made. 
The most frequent six constituent metaphors of IR discourse present in the corpus are considered 
here, three belong to the conceptual metaphor WORLD POLITICS IS ORDER29: order (574), institution* 
(386)30, system* (231). Three belong to the WORLD POLITICS IS ANARCHY/CHAOS metaphor: challenge* 
(99), danger* (55), conflict* (45). The constituents were firstly identified from the frequency list of 
the corpus and then validated as meaningful terms reflecting the metaphorical theorization of IR 
by the specialist co-author. Examples of the statements that revealed a metaphorical use of the 
constituents in the theorization of the thematic contexts are: 
 “Kissinger defines ‘world order’ as a concept of just international arrangements that is 
‘thought to be applicable to the entire world.’” (31 October 2014); 
  
“The result would not be a new order. It would be perilous disorder.” (27 September 2016); 
  
“The liberal international order has rested not simply on economic vitality and military 
strength. It has been anchored by a set of values whose appeal is universal. Freedom, the rule 
of law, human dignity, tolerance, pluralist institutions: these are all now scorned by the 
president-elect of the world’s most powerful nation. Liberal democracy itself is thus 
delegitimised.” (10 November 2016) and  
 
“It follows that the ability of the US to shape the world to its liking will rest increasingly on its 




                                                                    Figure 1: distribution table for Constituent Metaphors. 
 
If we observe their frequencies and their distribution table31 we can note that: a) writers 
devote more discursive attention to the metaphorical narrative of WORLD POLITICS IS ORDER than to 
                                                            
28 Thematic contexts are used in content analysis to determine the narratives that are dealt with through regular 
patterns, i.e. the “themes” that are observed across data sets that are important to the description of a phenomenon 
and are associated to a specific research question. It is a way of dealing with data focusing on the content of 
communicated material. 
29 It is a convention that Conceptual Metaphors are indicated in small capital letters. 
30 It is a convention of corpus linguistics that type-words are written in italics with their frequency following in 
parenthesis. When a type-word ends with an * it means that all the inflecting forms for that word are considered in 
the frequency count. 
31 Lines represent the word as it is distributed along the time axis. Thicker lines and black areas represent higher 
concentrations of the word repetition. 
 
the alternative WORLD POLITICS IS ANARCHY/CHAOS one. This reveals an intention to have readers 
perceive that ORDER is much more important than the institution or person who should guarantee 
it and to emphasize what might be lost; b) since these distribution graphs represent the corpus on 
a diachronic axis, where press and expert media are together, it can be said that the specific 
terminology of the experts is readily adopted by the journalists as well as the thematic contexts. 
Furthermore, since the corpus represents a heterogeneous authorship, it is evident that all the 
texts produced in the period are, in a way, ‘aligned’ with an agenda that considers paramount the 
maintenance of the status quo, or, at least, the protection of a given order. This is so to the point 
that the very nature of the order is taken for granted. The constant and even distribution of these 
terms suggests that we are observing a discursive activity that is enacting, by means of metaphoric 
statements, “a value system [that] is unlikely to take into account the feelings of the addressee: it 
is likely to count as an imposition of a set of values” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 12).  
In other words, the collective authorship is aligned along a specific agenda realized through 
the conceptual metaphor TRUMP IS CHAOS and, by means of frequent repetitions, it solicits a specific 
proactive response from the readership32.  
It has already been stated that the constant repetition in all the corpus of a number of 
words, sustained by their high frequency, points to an ideological goal. In Table 1 the constituent 
metaphors for the source domain Order and Chaos, incidentally two key-words of the Brookings’ 
blog Order from Chaos, have been listed and measured following the source domain of the two 
main conceptual metaphors identified in the corpus, namely WORLD POLITICS IS ORDER and WORLD 
POLITICS IS ANARCHY/CHAOS, the latter referring to the Hobbesian ‘state of nature’. 
 
 
                                       Table 1: Constituent metaphors for superordinate conceptual metaphors WORLD POLITICS IS ORDER and 
WORLD POLITICS IS ANARCHY/CHAOS.  
 
Given the frequencies of the two conceptual metaphors, and that of their constituents, one 
can say that there is a general preoccupation among all the authors in the corpus that Trump can 
destroy this order. Thus, rather than describing the characteristics of this possible ‘new chaos’ that 
is statistically not meaningful, the ‘establishment’ is preoccupied to stress and reiterate in 
different ways the concept of order, 2130 times, to suggest where the pivot of this order will be, 
i.e. China. In fact, 86% of the metaphorical narrative is devoted to ORDER, while 14% realizes the 
cognitive metaphor CHAOS; this complex interplay between the frequencies of the terms, the 
conceptual metaphors and the implicatures they generate, in the Gricean acceptation, points to 
the stand that the system is unwilling to consider the option that Trump could generate.  
Since the very beginning – considered the risk of CHAOS determined by the variable Trump – 
the metaphorical frame restructuring (Schon 1993: 137) operated by the media has a specific goal, 
that of making the entrance of China on the stage of the International Order more palatable and 
                                                            
32 This is in line with the emphasis put on his personality and problematic character by journalists and commentators, 
mentioned in section 3 and discussed in section 6. 
 
smoothly accepted to the international readership while ruling Trump out of it. The testimony that 
an accommodation strategy towards the country is at work here is also indicated by other 
linguistic evidence. The most important is the high frequency of China (915), almost double than 
that of order, but close to the one for Trump (861). Thus, even from a quantitative point of view, 
the ideal substitute is cognitively offered with a process that in NLP is known as ‘swish pattern’, a 
method that makes possible to ‘install’ an automatic, positive response to a certain stimuli, which 
has previously provided you with a negative outcome. Furthermore, its distribution clearly points 
to the future pivot of the world order.  
Furthermore, the dispersion of the constituent metaphorical words documented in Table 1 
points to another interesting phenomenon observed in political communication (Conoscenti, 
2013), namely, the use of sprinkled metonymies. Since readers are changing for the better in 
resisting to manipulative spinning techniques simply based on the repetition of a single word or 
concept, metonymy is preferred. In order to obtain a higher impact and influence on the audience, 
metonymy is ‘sprinkled’ through time and space in different texts using terminologies that belong 
to the same semantic area or thematic context. In this specific case, the evidence is even more 
interesting since the two main sprinkled metonymies are carried out by a number of individual 
authors. A possible explanation would be the one of a well-coordinated agenda by the editorial 
teams. Given the importance of this subject in current political communication, further 
investigation in the near future is required. 
 
 
6. Communicating the Tipping Point: Emotional Narratives 
Another issue addressed in the first part of the paper is the way Trump is portrayed. A 
suitable tool to verify this aspect is the Z-score: a statistical index used to measure a specific 
relationship between a node word and the words, named collocates, which occur in its 
neighbourhood33. The higher the value, the higher the likelihood two words collocate not by 
chance, but because of the author’s intention. Thus, types (vocabulary), tokens (frequency), 
collocations (the Z-score) and distribution allow us to index and realise a four-dimension matrix 
that maps the ways meaning is instantiated in a specific text and shapes reality. 
 
 
                                                                       Table 2: Z-score for the node word Trump. 
As can be observed in Table 2, the Z-score confirms both the qualitative analysis carried out in the 
first part, and the hypothesis of an existing agenda to spread the metaphor TRUMP IS CHAOS. The 
candidate, then POTUS, is qualified by means of pre and post-modifications that leave no room for 
a positive evaluation. Some examples of the statements generated are: 
 “But Mr Trump has abandoned America’s traditional support for European integration, 
suggesting that it would be a good idea if Britain voted to leave the EU.” (23 May 2016); 
                                                            
33 In our case we look at 5 words to the left and 5 to the right of the node word, in this case Trump. We also consider 
the frequency of the node word and of the collocate in the corpus and the total number of running words in it. 
 
  
“Unpredictability, in Mr Trump’s book, is a strength. Mostly though, he would attach 
unapologetic nationalism to old-fashioned isolationism.” (5 May 2016) and  
 
“He appears to be intent on replacing multilateralism with bilateralism, liberalism with 
protection and predictability with unpredictability.” (4 May 2017). 
 
 All the authors use the terminology in an evenly distributed way and with the clear intent 
of orienting readers’ interpretation to fostering the view that WORLD POLITICS IS ORDER and it is 
necessary, at any cost, while Trump is but a ‘variable’. Here the Trump discourse is instantiated as 
the recontextualization of a social practice that determines the orthodox norm and what the 
desired and accepted values for the current scenario are. Since metaphors are not a requirement 
of the semantic system but are a matter of speaker’s choice, the symbolic narrative generated by 
the authors makes it possible to identify “the propositions that underlie the cognitive basis of 
metaphors and reveal the intentions of speakers” (Charteris-Black, 2004: 11). Thus, we can focus 
on the persuasive intent of conveying an evaluation of the topic under discussion to the point that 
the ideology of the texts analysed is evident through the coherent view of reality that is 
consequently formed and reframed. Further evidence of the accommodation strategy we 
indicated. This is the reason why the word order assumes a strategic importance in the corpus. 
 
 
    Table 3: Patterns for order. 
In our corpus the traditional representational axis new order old order is articulated in 
a way that the pattern analysis in Table 3 makes evident. All the terminology and its ideological 
organisation points to a number of image schemas that are generated to contrast what is given –  
the international order before the tipping point, the one that should be maintained within the 
boundaries of the status quo – and the new – the scenario of a possible chaos that could be 
generated by the Trump administration. This is why authors place Trump, in quantitative and 
discoursive terms, far from the focus of order and with connotations that the Z-score has 
highlighted. Being considered a potential destabilising actor of the setting, Trump is found only at 
level 12 in position R2. It can be noted that the first levels around the central key word define all 
the possible variants of the order. The most frequent patterns thus generated are shown in Table 
4.  
At the same time it can be observed that the ideological system enacted by the diffused 
authorship tries to counterbalance the centrifugal effects that could be generated by the new, 
identifying a possible/different new pivot for the order, namely China. The country is present in 
levels 5, 6 and 10 in Left and Right positions. This entails a vision where China has the capacity to 
pre-modify the order – left positions – but it can be also be affected by it – right positions. Stated 
otherwise, postmodifications indicate that, in contrast with previous discourses on China, the 
latter having been ‘tamed’ by the international liberal order, it is now less dangerous. Another 
form of the discoursive accommodation strategy indicated earlier. Commentators do not envisage 
a role for Europe in this possible new scenario, since it is absent from the patterns. The 
contribution of the western institutions, placed at level 18, R3 and R4, is considered marginal.  
 
 
                                                 
                    Table 4: Clusters for order.                                                      Table 5: Clusters for system.     
Tables 4 and 534 show that, with respect to the academic usage in IR, the terms order and 
system are used as synonyms in the corpus. Furthermore, clusters for order uncover the 
commentators’ intent of advocating a specific ideological perspective even at the quantitative 
level. The traditional new order old order axis has little statistical importance, 8 references for 
each compound, in a limited range of articles (13). It is possible to say that the basic polarization 
new vs. old has been dropped, even from a cognitive point of view, in favour of a more complex 
and articulated vision. Order is pre-modified in different ways, but the first three entries total 278 
repetitions and cover the whole corpus. The ranking of the clusters in tables 4 and 5 shows that 
this discourse prefers a taxonomy of order that reflects the terminology of economics instead of 
the one of politics, in spite of the heterogeneous composition of the authorship and corpus.  
To appreciate the impact of these findings consider that order is present in the British 
National Corpus, a collection of authentic English language texts consisting of more than 100 
million words, 33,646 times. None of the collocates or clusters found in our corpus are present in 
its first 100 ranks. International order scores 28, liberal order (0), world order (122). This means 
that we have been able to detect and observe the introduction of a new set of statistically 
significant expressions and thematic contexts in a limited period of time in a specific area of expert 
and press discourse. 
A more balanced approach is shown by the clusters for system, another key-word of the 
source domain ORDER. In table 4 we can observe that the international system (34) is substantially 
a triangulation of a trading system (13), a political (11) and a global (11) one. The sum of the latter 
three (35) perfectly quantitatively balances the first one.  
It has already been said that both qualitative and quantitative analyses show a specific 
preoccupation of authors to support a specific view of the current state of the world order and an 
evident evaluation of Trump. This is confirmed by another analysis carried out with the LIWC2015 
software.35 The advantage of this tool is that it calculates the degree to which people use different 
categories of words. LIWC can check and count 80 different variables and their relative values are 
expressed in percentages. The output is linked to “32 word categories tapping psychological 
constructs (e.g., affect and cognition)” 36 and many others. The most important added value of the 
software is that its dictionaries and categories were validated through a rigorous peer reviewing 
process (Pennebaker and Francis, 1996). Each word can thus be counted and stored in different 
variables and can be referred to through the semantic networks – or Semantic Areas (SA) – it 
generates. The results for each corpus, expressed in percentages, can be checked against the 
                                                            
34 In table 3 range refers to the number of articles the compound is present. 
35 LIWC, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. For a detailed explanation of the program cf. http://liwc.wpengine.com/.  
36 Information cited from website and software accompanying documentation. 
 
values, expressed with a Grand Mean (GM), recorded for each category/genre of the speech/text 
used for the validation process. 
 
 
                                                                      Table 6: LIWC Semantic Areas in the Corpus. 
The SA that relate to affect words, see Table 6, confirm a discourse that is developed along a 
general negative feeling supported by the anxiety and anger SA. The corpus records a positive 
tone quite below the GM (-24.5%). This datum is confirmed by the weight the SA of negative 
emotion has (+34.2%) and the variance of the anxiety (+71.0%) and anger (+74%) ones.37 We are 
dealing with a number of texts that, in spite of the two discourse communities that generated 
them, concede a lot to negative emotional writing and give up a function of knowledgeable 
expertise and detachment that should be manifested by complex and articulated cognitive 
mechanisms typical of the academic and quality press genres. It can be said that the corpus 
mirrors, in terms of semantic networks, the language of Trump.  
Given the results of the elections and the course set by the Administration, this is a factor 
that should be considered by professional communicators who wish to counter specific 
political/communicative phenomena by means of a language that, in the end, tends to resonate 
with the ‘enemy’. In fact, all the terminologies and images observed in the corpus point to a 
limited number of conceptual metaphors that prefigure a post-structuralist joint activity of 
meaning construction aimed at generating a ‘compelling narrative’ as the one described by 
Westen (2007). The result is that it reinforces the ‘original one’, i.e. that activated by Trump, and 




The high level of anger and anxiety observed among Western commentators when dealing 
with Donald Trump is unusual, but it can be explained by the findings of our analysis. The 
impression shared by the press and expert media is that an unexpected and ‘unfortunate’ 
transition is underway, which will dissipate the long-term investment the US made in setting up 
the liberal international order. Trump’s “transactional view of international relations” is the key to 
understanding why “the larger, interdependent logic of the US-led system” is now lost  (Ikenberry, 
2017). Trump is associated with chaos throughout and his appearance during the 2016 
presidential campaign is blatantly a tipping point in the existence of the liberal order, as the media 
coverage proves. Consistently, a narrative is offered to the public opinion about China becoming 
the responsible stakeholder that many hoped for.     
The introduction of a new set of thematic contexts and terminologies has been observed. 
These point to an apparent ‘emotional reaction’ of the analysed diffused and collective 
authorship. As Coker (2015: 100) suggested, “the United States has identified the main trend in 
world politics, the rise of China, and it has not sought to oppose it. But […] it has failed to re-frame 
                                                            
37 This is also validated by the semantic networks related to the cognitive processes SA. The whole area scores -12.6% 
compared to the GM, while the insight and the tentative SA respectively are -26.4% and -22.2%. 
 
a competitive situation in a language intelligible to everyone else”. Today, the press and expert 
media seem to have taken upon themselves the task of making public opinion familiar with the 
increased role of emerging countries and accommodating them as new responsible major powers. 
Our findings show, however, that in doing so they give up the typical detachment of 
knowledgeable expertise, which is supposed to be a distinguishing feature of academic and quality 
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